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EXAMINATION OF EXPERT WITNESSES IN
NORTH CAROLINAt
WALKER J. BLAKEYt
The 1981 enactment by the North Carolina GeneralAssembly of sections 8-
58.12 through 8-58.14 of the North Carolina General Statutes and recent deci-
sions by the North Carolina Supreme Court have made it easier to introduce
expert testimony in North Carolina courts but have made the underlying theory of
expert testimony far more complicated North Carolina law now resembles the
provisions under the Federal Rules of Evidence which abolish the requirements
that the basis of the expert's opinion be stated, that the expert's opinion be based
upon facts in evidence, and that hypothetical questions be used The abolition of
these requirements has created "defacto" exceptions to the rule against hearsay.
Professor Blakey brify describes how these exceptions will work under the fed-
eral rules and then examines the similar exceptions created by the North Caro-
lina statutes and case law.
I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption by the North Carolina General Assembly of a bill with the
slightly misleading' title of "An Act to Eliminate the Hypothetical Question ' 2
is the latest in a series of recent developments3 that have made it easier to
introduce expert testimony in North Carolina courts. These developments re-
flect a general change in the way courts and lawyers throughout the country
f Copyright 1982 Walker J. Blakey
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Leon G. Scroggins, Jr., Holly B. Hanna,
Mary Patricia DeVine, Gregory Parker Chocklett and Dennis John Tolman, law students at the
University of North Carolina, provided valuable assistance in preparing this article. The author
wishes to thank Henry Brandis, Jr. and Kenneth S. Broun for their comments on many of the
points considered in this article.
This article draws upon work supported by the North Carolina Law Center and upon work
published in Blakey, An Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: Relevancy, Competency,
Privileges, Witnesses, Opinion, and Expert Witnesses, 14 TULSA L.J. 227 (1978) and Blakey, An
Introduction to the Oklahoma Evidence Code: The Thirty-Fourth Hearsay Exception, Information
Relied Upon as a Basis for Admissible Expert Opinion, 16 TULSA L.J. 1 (1980). The author re-
ceived assistance with that earlier work from Katharine Hershey, now a member of the Washing-
ton Bar;, Katherine McArthur, now a member of the North Carolina and Georgia Bars; Mary E.
Lee, now a member of the North Carolina Bar, James R. Wear, now a member of the Colorado
Bar;, and Charles Gary Hampton, now a member of the North Carolina Bar.
1. See infra Part III-A.
2. Law of June 11, 1981, ch. 543, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 816 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
8-58.12 to -58.14 (1981)).
3. These developments include the relaxation of some of the worst features of the ultimate
issue rule, see infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text, and the development of a sensible proce-
dure to permit at least some expert witnesses to rely upon "inherently reliable" out-of-court infbr-
mation. See infra Part V. Furthermore, in 1977 North Carolina adopted by statute a hearsay
exception for learned treatises and other documents based upon Federal Rule of Evidence




view expert testimony. An increased confidence in the general value of expert
testimony has been accompanied by a corresponding impatience with illogical
restrictions on its introduction.4 Courts and legislatures have responded by
abolishing many restrictions on expert testimony.
5
One of the strongest examples of this trend is presented by those portions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence that deal with expert testimony.6 Twenty-
three states have adopted similar provisions as parts of their own evidence
codes. 7 The North Carolina "Act to Eliminate the Hypothetical Question"
(the "Act") is based largely upon, and incorporates language from, Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 705.8 The combination of this statute with recent
decisions by the Supreme Court of North Carolina brings the North Carolina
law of expert witness examination into a position which is strikingly similar to
that adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The Act itself adopts almost all of the language and ideas of Federal
Rules of Evidence 702 and 705 concerning the qualifications of expert wit-
nesses and the forms in which expert testimony may be presented. 9 Nothing
in the Act corresponds to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, which describes the
types of facts that may be used as the basis of an expert's opinion and the
means by which the expert may learn of those facts, but recent decisions10 by
4. See FED. R. EvID. 702 & 705 advisory committee notes, in Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282-86 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Federal Advisory
Committee's Notes]; C. McCoRMicK, LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 16, 17 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
5. See C. McCoRMicK, supra note 4, § 16; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 702[06], 703[05], 704[03], 705[02] (1981).
6. FED. R. Evm. 702 & 705.
7. Four states had already adopted evidence codes containing such provisions prior to the
creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 801-805 (West 1966); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-456 to -458 (1976); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A, Rules 56-58 (West 1976); 9B UTAH
CODE ANN. Rules of Evidence 56-58 (1977). Nineteen additional states adopted such provisions
as part of evidence codes based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence. These states are Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mon-
tana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See 3 . WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5, J 702[06], 703105], 704[03], 705[02].
Two states, Ohio and South Dakota, adopted evidence codes based upon the Federal Rules of
Evidence but rejected the federal reforms concerning expert witnesses. Id
8. The Act, as codified, provides:
§ 8-58.12. There shall be no requirement that expert testimony be in response to a
hypothetical question.
§ 8-58.13. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion.
§ 8-58.14. Upon trial the expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless
an adverse party requests, otherwise, in which event the expert will be required to dis-
close such underlying facts or data on direct examination or voir dire before stating the
opinion. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or
data on cross-examination.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-58.12 to -58.14 (1981) (citations omitted).
9. See infra Parts Il and Hl.
10. See State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980); Booker v. Duke Medical Center,
297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979); State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979). See also
infra Parts V-A & V-C.
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the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopt procedures similar to those of the
federal rule for the examination of at least some expert witnesses. The one
major point upon which present North Carolina law apparently falls substan-
tially short of the reforms achieved by the federal rules is the retention of the
irrational rule'1 that purports to forbid opinion testimony upon the ultimate
issue to be decided by the jury because such testimony supposedly usurps the
function of the jury.' 2 Federal Rule of Evidence 704 abolishes any such re-
striction on otherwise admissible opinion testimony. It could be argued that
some of the language of the new North Carolina statutes is broad enough to
achieve the same result. The comments by the draftsmen of the federal rules
suggest that the language of rule 702 permitting expert testimony if it will
"assist the trier of fact. . . to determine a fact in issue," which North Carolina
adopted almost verbatim, 13 might be enough to abolish the ultimate issue rule
by itself14 and that the more specific language of Federal Rule of Evidence 704
was proposed merely "to allay any doubt on the subject."' Is Nevertheless, it
appears more likely that North Carolina will continue to follow some form of
the ultimate issue rule until some new statute or rule specifically abolishes it.
Recent decisions by the North Carolina Supreme Court, however, have re-
duced the amount of harm done by the ultimate issue rule.' 6 An interpreta-
tion of that rule which required some experts to give opinions on causation in
artificial "could or might" language 17 has been replaced by an interpretation' 8
that permits an expert to state his actual opinion. 19
11. See 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1920, 1921 (J. Chadbourn 1978); C. MCCORMICK, spra
note 4, § 12. The rule invites decisions that can be described with Professor Callahan's phrase,
"one is inclined to say they were not decided but perpetrated." C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSES-
SION 69 (1961) (describing certain decisions on adverse possession).
12. See 1 H. BRANDIS, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, SECOND REVISED EDI-
TION OF STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 126 (1982).
13. See § 2 of the Act, supra note 8. The only change from FED. R. EVID. 702 is the omission
of the final two words of the federal rule "or otherwise." This omission does not change the
meaning of the language borrowed from the federal rule.
14. See Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 284-85.
15. Id at 284.
16. State v. Brown, 300 N.C. 731, 733, 268 S.E.2d 201, 202-03 (1980); State v. Sparks, 297
N.C. 314, 325, 255 S.E.2d 373, 380-81 (1979); State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 568-71, 247 S.E.2d
905, 910-12 (1978).
17. See, eg., Patrick v. Treadwell, 222 N.C. 1, 21 S.E.2d 818 (1942); J.M. Pace Mule Co. v.
Seaboard Air Line Ry., 160 N.C. 252, 75 S.E. 994 (1912); Summerlin v. Carolina & N.W.Ry., 133
N.C. 550, 45 S.E. 898 (1903); 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 137 n.55.
18. Mann v. Virginia Dare Transp. Co., 283 N.C. 734, 747-48, 198 S.E.2d 558, 567-68 (1973);
Taylor v. Boger, 289 N.C. 560, 565, 223 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1976). See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12,
§ 137; Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C. App. 234,240-41,278 S.E.2d 566, 571-72 (1981). See also supra
cases cited at note 16.
19. The court has failed, however, to forbid the use of the "could or might formula." See
supra cases cited at notes 16 & 18. A party who uses that formula is taking a risk that its evidence
will be inadequate to support a finding in its favor. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 137 n.57.
An ambiguous "could or might" statement ought to be regarded with suspicion, but because of the
history of the "could or might" formula in North Carolina such testimony is likely to be treated as
if it were a positive statement of causation unless the surrounding evidence makes it clear that it is
not. Therefore, whenever an expert who says "could or might" actually means only ."could or
might" the opposing party should conduct a cross-examination designed to point out the weakness
of the expert's opinion.
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Although adoption of a North Carolina Evidence Code20 based upon the
Federal Rules of Evidence2 1 would offer an opportunity to abolish the ulti-
mate issue rule and to solve several other problems that remain under the
present North Carolina rules, 22 there are some points upon which the existing
North Carolina case law is clearer than the corresponding federal rules.
23
Therefore, the best possible system would be a combination of the federal
rules and the North Carolina cases.
This article will briefly describe the model of expert witness examination
created by the Federal Rules of Evidence and then discuss the corresponding
features of existing North Carolina law.
II. THE FEDERAL MODEL
A. Overview
Federal Rules of Evidence 701 through 706 are based upon a philosophy
that opinion testimony should be available whenever it would be useful to the
trier of fact.24 These rules restate the requirements for the use of lay and ex-
pert opinion testimony and for the qualifications of expert witnesses in terms
that carefully avoid creating any artificial barriers to the introduction of useful
opinion testimony. They also abolish several long-standing requirements that
would limit the use of opinion testimony. Rule 704 abolishes any requirement
forbidding (or limiting) opinion testimony on ultimate issues. Rule 703 abol-
ishes the requirement that the expert's opinion be based upon facts proven by
the evidence and allows the expert to base his opinion on facts that may not
even be admissible in evidence. Rule 705 makes the disclosure of the underly-
ing facts or data upon which an opinion is based discretionary, and thereby
abolishes the requirement that hypothetical questions must be used in examin-
ing an expert who is giving an opinion based upon facts not within his per-
sonal knowledge.
Federal rules 703 and 705 also require a number of changes in prior prac-
tice that they do not spell out but that follow logically from the changes that
are stated in those rules. They create new exceptions to standard rules of evi-
dence, including three exceptions to the rule against hearsay. There is a major
hearsay exception under rule 705, which may allow an expert to base an opin-
20. See Blakey, Moving Towards An Evidence Law of General Princiles: Several Suggestions
Concerning an Evidence Codefor North Carolina, 13 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1981) for a descrip-
tion of the work of the North Carolina Study Committee on the Laws of Evidence and Compara-
tive Negligence on a proposed North Carolina Evidence Code.
21. See id. at 8-9 and Patrick, Towarda CodXcation ofthe Law ofEvidence in North Carolina,
16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 669 (1980).
22. North Carolina needs a general hearsay exception for statements of medical histories
such as FED. R. EVID. 803(4). See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 161 an.l 1 & 14. North Caro-
lina also needs to eliminate doubts about whether experts other than physicians may rely upon
"inherently reliable" out-of-court information and to clarify what kinds of information can be
"inherently reliable." See infra Part V.
23. See infra Parts III-A & V-A.
24. Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 282; 3 J. WrNSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 5, 702101].
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ion upon facts that need never be introduced into evidence. There is another
sigiiificant hearsay exception under rule 703, which permits an expert to base
an opinion upon facts that may not be admissible in evidence except in expla-
nation of that opinion. Finally, there is a minor exception under rule 705,
which permits an expert witness to talk about facts that are not within his
personal knowledge without the use of hypothetical questions. All three are
exceptions to the hearsay rule, but the larger two exceptions are also excep-
tions to requirements such as authentication and the best evidence rule.25
B. Use of Opinion Testimony
Rule 701 provides that a lay witness may testify to an opinion if it is based
on personal knowledge and is "helpful to a clear understanding of his testi-
mony or the determination of a fact in issue." The effect of this provision is
that even a lay opinion should be admitted if it is useful. This permits both
"shorthand statements of facts" that the witness cannot be expected to break
down into the actual facts he had observed and any other opinion that has
enough value to be useful.
26
Expert opinion and other expert testimony may be used under rule 702
whenever "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge" would "assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
The expert is not required to base his opinion on personal knowledge. 27
Under rule 702, any witness "qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training or education" may testify if the evidence meets the helpfulness
standard. This "deflinition is farreaching; an "expert" may be an otherwise
quite ordinary person whose experience gives him knowledge concerning
some matter involved in the trial.
28
Under rule 704, opinion testimony that is otherwise admissible cannot be
25. See generally McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 MER-
CER L. Rav. 463 (1977).
Some readers may find it helpful to use a metaphor taken from childhood fairy tales to ex-
plain what these Federal Rules of Evidence actually do. I find it useful to call the three different
exceptions created by rules 703 and 705 the "Three Bears" exceptions. Rule 705 creates both a
"Big Bear" exception and a "Baby Bear" exception. Under the tiny "Baby Bear" exception the
trial judge has discretion to permit an expert witness to refer directly, rather than hypothetically,
to facts supporting his opinion that are proven by other evidence but that are not within the
expert's personal knowledge. This is a tiny hearsay exception to solve a tiny but real hearsay
problem. Common law practice would have compelled the expert ta refer to such facts only as
hypothetical possibilities. Under the "Big Bear" exception the trial judge has similar discretion to
permit such an expert to state and explain an opinion based upon facts that are not only not within
his personal knowledge but that are also not proven by any of the evidence in the record. This is
an enormous exception. The most important exception, however, is the "Middle Bear" exception
created by rule 703 under which facts that are not in evidence and which may not be otherwise
even admissible in evidence may be used by an expert as the basis of an opinion if they are "of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." In any particular situation two or
three of these exceptions may overlap each other, and it is necessary to be very careful in identify-
ing which exceptions apply where. I find the "Three Bears" device helpful in sorting out these
exceptions.
26. Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 281.
27. See FED. R. EvD. 702; Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 282.
28. Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 282.
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excluded because it embraces "an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact." In order to be admissible at all, an opinion must be offered through
either a lay person with personal knowledge of the facts or an expert witness
with special qualifications, and must be helpful to the trier of fact.29 There is
no reason why such an opinion should be excluded or restated because it deals
with a question the jury (or other factfinder) must ultimately decide.30 This
provision does not mean that meaningless opinions on the issues to be tried
are now admissible. They are excluded by the requirement that opinions must
be helpful to the trier of fact.
31
C. Three Related Changes
Rules 705 and 703 make major changes both in the methods that may be
used to examine expert witnesses and in the kinds of opinions and other infor-
mation that may be introduced through the testimony of expert witnesses.
These changes do not prohibit any prior methods of examination, such as the
use of hypothetical questions, and in many situations trial lawyers will con-
tinue to use the old procedures because they appear to be the best procedures
with which to present the particular evidence in their case. It should also be
pointed out that the requirements abolished by rules 705 and 703 frequently
were either ignored or treated as useless formalities in many cases tried under
the common law.32 Nevertheless, the means by which rules 705 and 703
achieve the abolition of these requirements involve the creation of radically
new theories concerning the nature and purpose of expert testimony. These
new theories lead to some totally new problems.
Rules 705 and 703 consist largely of sweeping provisions that reject prior
requirements far more clearly than they explain what new requirements will
now exist. Despite their vagueness, or perhaps in part because of it, the new
Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with expert witnesses were an immediate
success. Smith and Henley wrote in 1976: "Recent trial experience under the
new rules indicates that this approach is much simpler, takes much less time,
and promotes a much more orderly presentation of evidence."
'33
Nevertheless, it would have been better if these rules had spelled out
more clearly how they were to work. Thus, rule 703 should have explained the
circumstances in which an expert who is permitted to base an opinion on
"inadmissible" data will also be permitted to refer to the data in his testimony
in order to explain the opinion. Rule 703 does not make any sense unless the
expert can refer to inadmissible data,34 but the rule should have dealt with the
29. FED. R. EviD. 701 & 702.
30. See supra notes 11 & 12 and accompanying text.
31. Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 282.
32. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note5, 703[01]. See also Maguire & Hahesy,
Requisite Proof of Basisfor Expert Opinion, 5 VAND. L. Ray. 432 (1952); Rheingold, The Basis of
Medical Testimony, 15 VAND. L. Rav. 473 (1962).
33. Smith & Henley, Opinion Evidence: An Analysis of the New Federal Rules and Current
Washington Law, 11 GONZAGA L. Rav. 692, 697 (1976).
34. See McElhaney, supra note 25, at 482-83.
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problem. The Supreme Court of North Carolina did spell out exactly these
circumstances when it announced a similar rule in State v. Wade.35 The North
Carolina rule provides that the expert may refer to inadmissible but "inher-
ently reliable" information for the limited purpose of showing the basis for the
expert's opinion.3
6
1. Abolition of the Requirement that the Basis for the
Expert's Opinion Be Stated
Rule 705 permits an expert witness to give an opinion "without prior dis-
closure of the underlying facts or data." The effect of this provision is to per-
mit an expert witness simply to state his opinion without stating the facts upon
which it is based and without the use of a hypothetical question. This form of
testimony may be used "unless the court requires otherwise," but rule 705 does
not suggest any standard to guide the trial court in deciding whether to "re-
quire otherwise." The discussion below suggests some circumstances in which
the trial court might be persuaded to use this power,3 7 but the draftsmen did
not intend for the trial judge automatically to require that the basis for the
opinion be shown even when the opposing party objects to the absence of
foundation for an opinion.
38
If the trial court does not require the basis to be shown, each of the parties
must decide whether to bring it out in their examination of the witness. If the
party calling the witness does not bring out the basis on direct examination of
the witness, the opposing party may bring it out on cross-examination. But if
neither party chooses to bring out the basis for an opinion, the testimony of a
qualified expert may consist of nothing more than a naked statement of his
opinion.39 This probably will not occur very often. Rule 705 does not prohibit
35. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
36. Id at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
37. See infra Part II-C(2).
38. McElhaney argues:
The other way to deal with the problem is to ask the trial court to require hypothetical
questions, retreating from the advances of the Federal Rules. This backward step is not
likely to be attractive to federal district judges, whose crowded dockets can be eased by
the timesaving aspects of Article 7. Since both the voir dire examination and the hypo-
thetical question are now discretionary with the trial court, it seems probable that they
will only be imposed by the court when the opposing counsel asserts on the good-faith
basis of full discovery that the opinion about to be offered will ultimately be
inadmissible.
McElhaney, supra note 25, at 489. Louisell and Mueller agree:
The phrasing of the Rule suggests that this kind of to-the-point presentation should
be routinely allowed. To be sure, the Rule allows the trial judge to "require otherwise";
however, the sense of the provision is that he should not so require as a practice, but
should do so only where he finds particular facts, peculiarly important in the individual
case, which indicate a special need to develop the foundation first.
3 D. LOUIsELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 400, at 707 (1979).
39. See infra notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text for a widely used hypothetical illustration
of such testimony. It is clear that the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence intended to
create the possibility of such testimony. The Advisory Committee wrote: "If the objection is made
that leaving it to the cross-examiner to bring out the supporting data is essentially unfair, the
answer is that he is under no compulsion to bring out any facts or data except those unfavorable to
the opinion." Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 286.
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either the use of hypothetical questions or the introduction of other testimony
explaining the basis of the expert's opinion. The parties will usually choose to
introduce evidence showing the basis for expert opinions in order to persuade
the judge or jury to believe or disbelieve those opinions.
It is possible under rule 705, however, that a judge or jury might be asked
to decide a disputed question on the basis of unexplained assertions by expert
witnesses. Proponents of rule 705 might argue that this frequently did happen
under common law procedures except that, instead of being denied explana-
tions, judge and jury were buried under explanations that they could not un-
derstand.4° This was especially apt to be true if it was necessary to use a
hypothetical question in order to ask the expert to state an opinion based upon
facts of which he did not have personal knowledge. Rule 705 attempts to solve
the problem of excessive and incomprehensible evidence concerning expert
opinion by abolishing (unless the court requires otherwise) the requirement
that the party offering the expert must "make a record" during the trial show-
ing the basis for the opinion.
4 1
Rule 705 abolishes only the requirements that the basis for an expert
opinion be stated and not the requirement that there be a basis for the opinion.
Rule 705 creates several problems, however, with the questions of when and
how the actual existence of an adequate basis must be shown. The provision
in rule 705 authorizing the admission of an expert opinion without any revela-
tion of its basis must be read as applying to both questions of admissibility and
sufficiency. Whenever an expert opinion has been introduced without any in-
quiry into the basis for that opinion, the court must presume that an adequate
basis exists unless evidence disproving the basis is introduced. A trial judge
who is unwilling to presume the existence of a basis for a particular expert
opinion may exercise his discretion to require the party offering the opinion to
prove a basis when the opinion is offered, but if an expert opinion is admitted
without evidence proving its basis, the existence of an adequate basis must be
presumed (in the absence of contrary evidence). Any other reading of rule 705
would turn that rule into a trap for those who rely upon it.
The problems grow even more difficult in cases in which one party at-
tempts to offer an expert opinion without showing a basis, and the other party
does wish to dispute the adequacy of the basis. The trial judge could exercise
his discretion under rule 705 and require the party offering the expert to show
the existence of an adequate basis whenever the opposing party objects to an
expert opinion. It seems unlikely that it could ever be error to require that the
basis be shown, and it certainly never could be prejudicial error. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the draftsmen of rule 705 did not intend for the trial court to
require the basis for an expert opinion to be shown whenever the opposing
party objected. Rule 705 gives the trial court, not the opposing party, the dis-
cretion to require that the basis be shown. Clearly, the draftsmen of rule 705
40. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 4, § 16; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5,
705101]; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 686 (3d ed. 1940).
41. See supra note 39.
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contemplated that in at least some cases the opposing party should be required
to do something more than merely object to an expert opinion in order to
require that a basis be shown. In such cases the opposing party will be re-
quired to point out a particular problem in order to raise the question of the
adequacy of the basis.
The opposing party may question the adequacy of the basis in four differ-
ent ways. First, the opposing party has an automatic right to attack the ade-
quacy of the basis through cross-examination of the expert, and if cross-
examination shows that the basis is inadequate, the opinion will be stricken
from the record. This method of attack cannot be used, however, until the
opinion has already been introduced. Second, the opposing party may seek to
keep the expert opinion from ever being introduced by requesting that the trial
judge exercise his discretion under rule 705 to order the party offering the
expert opinion to lay a foundation for that opinion by showing a basis for it.
Third, the opposing party may ask the court to exercise its general discretion
and allow a voir dire examination. Fourth, the opposing party may file a pre-
trial motion to exclude the expert testimony.
To make effective use of any of the first three methods of attack, the op-
posing party must already recognize the questionable aspect of the basis for
the expert's opinion. It is unlikely that the trial judge will order either a dem-
onstration of the basis for the opinion or a voir dire of the expert unless the
opposing party can show that there is likely to be something questionable
about the basis for the opinion. Apparently, the opposing party will be ex-
pected to prepare its attacks through pretrial discovery.42 A party who does
prepare through pretrial discovery of the expert's possible basis will also be
able to use the fourth method of attack-a pretrial motion to exclude improper
opinion testimony.
It seems clear that the burden of persuading the court that there is an
adequate basis for an expert opinion remains with the party who offers the
opinion as evidence. The burden of raising a bona fide question about the
adequacy of that basis, however, apparently has been shifted to the party seek-
ing to oppose the introduction of that opinion. This might be more accurately
described as a "burden of discovery" than as a burden of coming forward. In
a case in which the opposing party can justify its failure to conduct adequate
discovery, the trial court probably should exercise its discretion to require that
the basis for an expert opinion be shown by the party offering the opinion.43
Of course, a party offering an expert opinion probably will want to offer
evidence concerning some parts of the basis for that opinion, rather than to
offer a naked opinion without any supporting basis. The disclosure of part of
the basis raises the question whether the entire basis of the opinion must now
42. See Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 286; 11 J. MOORE & H. BEN-
DIX, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 705.10 at VII-70 (2d ed. 1982); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BER-
GER, supra note 5, 705[01]. Nevertheless, Weinstein and Berger warn that in criminal cases "an
attorney will be less likely to have sufficient advance knowledge for effective cross-examination."
Id
43. See 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, supra note 5, 705[01], at 705-10.
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be shown. The same question arises whenever the opposing party exercises its
right to explore the basis of the opinion on cross-examination. It could be
argued in both situations that there should come a point at which so much
information about the basis of the opinion has been introduced that the hear-
say exception which allows an expert to base an opinion on facts that have not
been introduced into evidence should disappear, and the party offering the
opinion should be required to introduce all the evidence that would have been
required under prior practice. After all, this exception is merely a logical con-
sequence of the provision in Federal Rule of Evidence 705 that authorizes the
admission of some opinions "without prior disclosure of the underlying facts
or data."
Nevertheless, this hearsay exception will probably be held to continue in
effect even after substantial disclosure of the basis for the expert's opinion.
The Federal Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 705
seems to assume that the supporting data need not be brought out even if the
cross-examiner brings out data "unfavorable to the opinion."44 The rule does
set a limitation on the extent to which an expert will be allowed to base an
opinion on facts not in evidence. It is the discretion of the trial court to require
disclosure. Partial disclosure of the basis may lead the trial court to order full
proof of facts adequate to support the opinion. The trial court should take
care, however, not to exercise that discretion in an unfair manner. Counsel
should be given notice that the court has decided to require proof of the basis
for an opinion and should be afforded a full opportunity to introduce such
proof.
Professor McElhaney assumes that a hearsay exception under rule 705
will allow an expert to base an opinion on facts not introduced into evidence
in many cases in which there is substantial discussion of some parts of the
basis for an expert's opinion. He writes:
The real advantage of Rule 705 is that it permits the streamlin-
ing of hypothetical questions. They no longer need to be stiff and
stylized. As long as they are not misleading, there is no reason why
an examiner cannot be far more selective than before in choosing the
contents of hypothetical questions.
45
2. Abolition of the Requirement that a Hypothetical Question Be Used
When an Expert Witness Does Not Have Personal Knowledge of
the Facts upon Which His Opinion is Based
Rule 705 creates a minor hearsay exception that permits an expert witness
to refer to the facts upon which his opinion is based without the use of a hypo-
thetical question. The rule does not say this. It does not even use the term
"hypothetical question." But the rule and the Federal Advisory Committee's
44. Federal Advisory Committe's Notes, supra note 4, at 285-86.
45. McElhaney, supra note 25, at 488. See also id at 488 n.96; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 5, 705[01].
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA4 LAW REVIEW[
Note46 to the rule make sense only if rule 705 permits an expert to refer di-
rectly to facts to which he previously could refer only hypothetically. Of
course, the examining party can still use a hypothetical question if he wishes.47
Furthermore, the trial court's discretion to require that the basis for an opinion
be shown would appear to include discretion to require the use of a hypotheti-
cal question.
48
McElhaney suggests that the abolition of the requirement that the basis
be disclosed will permit the use of partial hypotheticals and other partial reve-
lations of the basis of an expert opinion.49 The common law requirement that
all such questions must be fair 50 still applies because rule 702 requires all ex-
pert testimony to be helpful. If, however, the trial court permits the expert to
be examined without a full disclosure of the basis for his opinion, it may be
difficult for the trial court to tell when such a question is unfair. Once again
the opposing party will have to be prepared to explain to the court what is
wrong with the expert's testimony.
51
3. Abolition of the Requirement that the Expert's Opinion Be Based Upon
Facts in Evidence
Rule 703 authorizes an expert to base his opinion on facts in the case itself
that he has either "perceived" or had "made known to him at or before the
hearing." He may base his opinion upon facts that are not in evidence if they
are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in form-
ing opinions or inferences upon the subject."
Rule 703 creates two new problems. The first problem is determining
when a particular piece of information relied upon by an expert is "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject." Professor McElhaney points out the difficulty of
transferring a standard of decision from some other field into the courtroom:
What other fields regard as reliable ought to concern us. We
should consider their norms in assessing our own. But the standards
of reliability in any particular field must take into account the special
situation in which it arises. A medical doctor making an emergency
diagnosis at the scene of an accident will not use the same standards
of reliability as he did in the research laboratory he left just before
starting home. Trials are supposed to provide an opportunity for
calm deliberation, appropriately taking longer to review events than
46. Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, su.pra note 4, at 285-86.
47. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 38, § 400. Weinstein and Berger argue that the
trial court does have authority under relevancy rules to exclude hypothetical questions that are
"confusing or repetitious or unnecessary." 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER, supra note 5 705[01],
at 705-07.
48. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 38, § 400, at 712; L WEINSTEIN & M. BEROER,
supra note 5, 705[01], at 705-06.
49. McElhaney, supra note 25, at 488.
50. C. McCoRmicK, supra note 4, § 14. See 3 D. LouIsELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 38,
§ 400; id at 716 n.14.
51. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
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the events themselves may have taken to transpire. The standard of
reasonableness that the judge should apply is the judicial one, look-
ig at the expert's field for guidance but not for ultimate decision.52
Therefore, it is the trial judge who must decide when the expert's reliance on
information not in evidence is so reasonable that he should be permitted to
base his testimony upon it. Once again, if the expert is not required to explain
the basis for his opinion under rule 705, it may be difficult for the trial court to
discover even the fact that the expert is relying on information not in evidence.
And once again the opposing party must be prepared through discovery to
point out to the trial court what the expert is doing.
53
The second problem is the extent to which reliance by the expert on infor-
mation not in evidence makes such information usable in the trial itself. All
that rule 703 purports to do is to authorize the use of an opinion based upon
such information.54 Any dispute about the correctness of that opinion, how-
ever, surely will require a discussion of the information upon which it is
based.55 Therefore, federal rule 703 must authorize another hearsay exception
that permits testimony about facts otherwise inadmissible as evidence. It is
generally argued that this is a limited use exception;56 but since the limited use
is to support the expert's opinion, McElhaney is correct when he calls federal
rule 703 "virtually a major new exception to the hearsay rule."
'57
III. NORTH CAROLINA ABOLISHES ANY REQUIREMENT THAT A
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION BE USED IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN
EXPERT WITNESS
.4. Optional Use of Hypothetical Questions.
House Bill 39458 is titled "An Act to Eliminate the Hypothetical Ques-
tion," but it did not "eliminate" the hypothetical question. Any attorney who
is questioning an expert witness may use any hypothetical question that he
would have been permitted to use under prior law.59 The statute does, how-
ever, give an attorney the option to ask for an expert opinion without using a
hypothetical question even though prior law would have required its use.
52. McElhaney, supra note 25, at 486. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 466-67 (3d ed. 1982).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
54. See McElhaney, supra note 25, at 481-82; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 52, at
467.
55. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 52, at 467.
56. See McElhaney, supra note 25, at 482 n.83; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 52,
at 467; J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 42, § 705.10, at VII-73. But see Blakey,An Introduction
to the Oklahoma Evidence Cod" The Thirty-Fourth Hearsay Exception, Information Relied Upon
as a Basis for Admissible Expert Opinion, 16 TULSA L.J. 1, 34-40 (1980).
57. McElhaney, supra note 25, at 481.
58. Enacted as Law of June 11, 1981, ch. 543, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 816 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 8-58.12 to -58.14 (1981)). See supra note 8 for the provisions of the Act.
59. Dean Brandis argues that the trial judge should have discretion to prevent the voluntary
use of hypotheticals whenever, as in the case of hypotheticals of great length, they constitute "pro-
fessionally competent abuse of the hypothetical." 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 137 n.43.
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The statute was a response to widespread dissatisfaction with the use of
hypothetical questions. These questions can be used successfully when the
circumstances of the case are such that simple and clear hypothetical questions
are possible. Far more often, however, the hypothetical question is an incom-
prehensible formality that completely conceals the expert's thinking. As Dean
Brandis pointed out, "Very long hypotheticals are well calculated to confuse-
or lose-any jury lacking the courage and common sense to disregard every-
thing except the general drift of the answer."60 Although some of the problems
caused by hypothetical questions may be blamed on inadequate preparation
by counsel, better preparation will not cure the basic problems with the use of
hypothetical questions. Dean Brandis also commented, "In the construction
of a hypothetical question, the grossest ineptitude and the most skilled preci-
sion can produce results which if not equally erroneous, are nevertheless
equally ridiculous. '61 McCormick concluded:
The hypothetical question is an ingenious and logical device for en-
abling the jury to apply the expert's scientific knowledge to the facts
of the case. Nevertheless, it is a failure in practice and an obstruction
to the administration of justice. If we require that it recite all the
relevant facts, it becomes intolerably wordy. If we allow, as most
courts do, the interrogating counsel to select such of the material
facts as he sees fit, we tempt him to shape a one-sided hypothesis.
62
McCormick 63 and Brandis64 supported Wigmore's proposal65 that the use
of hypothetical questions be made optional unless the trial judge requires that
one be used. Federal Rule of Evidence 705 adopts this idea of judicial discre-
tion.66 The North Carolina statute is based, in part, upon federal rule 705, but
it does not follow the portion of the federal rule that gives the trial judge dis-
cretion to require the use of a hypothetical question. Instead, it gives the op-
tion to examining counsel, who cannot be required to use a hypothetical
question. 6 7 The statute provides: "There shall be no requirement that expert
testimony be in response to a hypothetical question."'68 The North Carolina
statute also deprives the trial judge of some of the discretion that the federal
rule entrusts to him with respect to prior disclosure of the facts upon which an
expert's opinion is based. Some discretion is given to the adverse party, who
may decide that "the expert will be required to disclose such underlying facts
or data on direct examination or voir dire before stating the opinion."
' 69
Under this system, examining counsel may need to be prepared to do every-
60. Id
61. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 137 n.2 (H. Brandis rev. 1973).
62. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 4, § 16, at 36.
63. Id at 36-37.
64. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 137 n.43.
65. 2 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 686 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979).
66. See supra note 47.
67. But see I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 137 n.42. See also Ayscue, More EvIdence-The
Hypothetical Question Comes Under 4ttack, 32 B. NOTES, July-Aug. 1981, at 7,9.
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.12 (1981).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.14 (1981).
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thing that would be necessary to lay the foundation for a hypothetical ques-
tion, but he then can ask the expert witness for an opinion without using a
hypothetical question.
B. Examining Expert Wtnesses Without Hypothetical Questions
Prior law required a hypothetical question to be used when the expert
witness did not have personal knowledge of the facts to which his opinion
applied. The new statute does not explain what procedure is to be substituted
for a hypothetical question, but it would appear that the expert will simply be
permitted to give his opinion and to state the facts upon which the opinion is
based even though he has only a hearsay knowledge of the facts that are not
within his personal knowledge. This would be a violation of the rule against
hearsay, but the new statute should be read as creating a minor hearsay excep-
tion for statements by an expert about facts that are in evidence but not within
his personal knowledge. This small hearsay exception should be carefully dis-
tinguished from the much more important exception recognized in State v.
Wade that will permit an expert to discuss some facts that are not even in
evidence.
70
The North Carolina statute does not change prior law with respect to the
facts that may be used as the basis for an expert's opinion. North Carolina law
permits an expert witness to rely upon three kinds of facts: (1) information
within the expert's personal knowledge; (2) other information furnished to the
expert that is not within his personal knowledge but which satisfies the "inher-
ent reliability" standards of State v. Wade, Booker v. Duke Medical Center,7 1
and State v. Franks,72 and (3) other relevant information that has been intro-
duced into evidence.73 One effect of the recent decisions by the Supreme Court
of North Carolina in Wade, Booker, and Franks, which permit some expert
witnesses to base opinions upon facts not within their personal knowledge but
found to be "inherently reliable," is to reduce the number of cases in which a
hypothetical question would be necessary even under prior law.
The hearsay exception created by section 1 of the new statute only applies
to facts that are already in evidence and that, therefore, could have been in-
cluded in a hypothetical question if one had been used. How does an expert
learn what particular facts are in evidence and, therefore, the facts that may be
used as a basis for his opinion under this new hearsay exception? The North
Carolina statute does not deal with this question, but logic suggests that it
would certainly be proper for the expert to base his opinion upon either testi-
mony he had heard74 or a transcript he had read. Even an oral summary of
other testimony may be a proper basis for his testimony.
75
70. See infra Part V-A.
71. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
72. 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980).
73. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, §§ 136, 137.
74. See id § 137 & fn.58 & 59.
75. See Comment, Expert Medical Testimony: Differences Between the North Carolina Rules
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C Avoiding Irrational Restrictions on the Form of Testimony
The goal of the draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Evidence was to permit
expert witnesses to testify in the same manner they would use in discussing a
problem in their own offices or laboratories. 76 An expert stating his own opin-
ion in his own words is very likely to violate two rules that have sometimes
been applied to expert testimony: the rule previously followed by the North
Carolina courts forbidding positive statements of causation in hypothetical
testimony and the supposed rule forbidding opinion testimony based upon
other opinion testimony. Neither rule should have been applied to even hypo-
thetical testimony, and they certainly should not be applied to testimony given
without the use of hypothetical questions.
The rule forbidding positive statements of causation testimony in hypo-
thetical testimony and requiring statements that an event merely "could or
might" cause a result77 has been undercut by the decision of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Mann v. Virginia Dare Transportation Co.78 An
expert witness should be permitted to make as strong a statement of causation
as he is able to make.
There is not, never has been, and never could be an actual rule forbidding
expert opinions to be based upon other opinions.79 The cases in which such a
rule is announced are either aberrations or ones in which the statements about
opinions based upon opinions are dicta.80 Opinion testimony is frequently
and Federal Rules of Evidence, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833, 837 (1976) (following a suggestion
in P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 81 (1973)).
76. Federal Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 4, at 283.
77. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 137; supra cases cited at note 17.
78. 283 N.C. 734, 747-48, 198 S.E.2d 558, 567-68 (1973). See supra note 19. See also Taylor
v. Boger, 289 N.C. 560, 565, 223 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1978); Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C. App. 234,
240-41, 278 S.E.2d 566, 571-72 (1981).
79. See 2 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 682 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979).
It is sometimes said that "an opinion of an expert cannot be based upon opinions
expressed by other experts"; but this is unsound .... mhe basis for a hypothetical
opinion may be either data observed or data inferred, and that inferred data presented
by expert testimony may equally well become a part of the basis for a hypothetical ques-
tion; e.g. (as in the case cited) a fireman may testify to coal in the furnace, and a chemist
may testify, hypothetically on the burning of coal, that the gas generated would be car-bon monoxide, and then another expert may be asked what would be the effect of an
explosion of carbon monoxide on starch dust in the oven room. There is no mysterious
logical fatality in basing "one expert opinion upon another"; it is done every day in
business and in applied science.
Id. at 956-57 (footnote omitted).
80. Brandis summarizes the North Carolina authorities as follows:
It has been said, in broad terms, that an expert may not base his opinion upon the
opinion of another expert; but it seems that, in fact, when the other opinion was before
the jury, it was allowed to become the basis for assumptions in hypothetical questions. It
would seem that it may now be included in the basis for an opinion, though hypotheti-
cals are no longer necessary.
I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 136 (footnotes omitted). Brandis goes on to point out how often
opinions of other persons have been used in North Carolina as the basis for assumptions in hypo-
thetical questions. Id at n.22.
There are two North Carolina cases that do state a rule against opinion based upon the opin-
ion of another expert, but in each case the statement was dictum. In both State v. David, 222 N.C.
242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942), and State v. Hamilton, 16 N.C. App. 330, 192 S.E.2d 24 (1972), there
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used as evidence to prove the facts required as a basis for expert opinions.81
The only logical problem with such testimony is the possible ambiguity as to
whether the expert is assuming that the opinion was merely stated or that the
fact stated is actually true. A lawyer preparing a hypothetical question should
eliminate any ambiguity, but it is not a real danger. An expert witness who
states that he is relying upon an opinion of another is surely assuming both the
existence of the opinion and its truth, and he should be so understood.
IV. DISCLOSURE OF UNDERLYING FACTS OR DATA UNDER THE NORTH
CAROLINA STATUTE
A. The Adverse Party Has Power to Require Prior Disclosure
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 705 there is a possibility that expert
opinion testimony may be introduced without the facts or data upon which the
opinion is based having been disclosed to the jury orjudge. The adverse party
always has a right (under both Federal Rule of Evidence 705 and the North
Carolina statute) to bring out the underlying facts or data on cross-examina-
tion; but if the opinion is already in evidence, the adverse party may not find it
worthwhile to bring out the foundation for the opinion.82 This is a radical
change from prior law under which the basis of an expert opinion was consid-
ered an essential foundation necessary to prove the correctness of that opin-
ion.83 Under the new procedure, unless the basis is required to be shown, an
expert opinion can stand on its own without any disclosed basis. There must
still be a basis in fact, but that basis may not appear in the evidence introduced
into the record. The Subcommittee on the Proposed Rules of Evidence of the
Colorado Bar Association objected to this change during the congressional
debates on the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence and offered the fol-
lowing illustration:
The proposed rules require no foundation to be admitted on which
the expert based his opinion. Your committee feels that it is abso-
lutely essential that a foundation be required before an expert opin-
ion be admitted. Otherwise, once any expert has been qualified as
such he could offer his opinion on any matter with no reasons to
support that opinion. For example, one can envision the following
dialogue immediately after the expert had been qualified as an ortho-
pedic surgeon:
Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree
of medical [ce]rtainty as to the extent of permanent disability suf-
fered by the plaintiff as a result [of] this automobile accident?
were far more serious problems with the procedure used than the use of opinion evidence as a
basis for the assumptions in the hypothetical questions. In both David and Hamilton the other
expert's opinion was not included in the hypothetical, and in Hamilton the other expert's opinion
was not even in evidence. The procedures under review in those two cases might be permissible
under Federal Evidence Rule 703 or the "inherently reliable" hearsay exception of Wade, but they
were clearly unacceptable under then existing North Carolina law.
81. See 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 136 n.22.
82. See 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, supra note 42, § 705.10, at VII-72.
83. United States v. Santarpio, 560 F.2d 448 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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A. Yes.
Q. What is your opinion?
A. She is totally [and] permanently disabled.
Q. Thank you, doctor, that is all.8 4
In fact, it is unlikely that very many plaintiffs' attorneys would be willing
to stop at that point. Weinstein and Berger, however, quote the statement by
the Colorado subcommittee and then comment, "Congress found no objection
to such brevity. Many judges would welcome it."85 Professor McElhaney has
suggested, perhaps more realistically, that the "real advantage of Rule 705 is
that it permits the streamlining of hypothetical questions" so that a questioner
can be "far more selective than before in choosing the contents of hypothetical
questions.
'86
Under the federal rule, the examining attorney is entitled to decide
whether his client's case can best be presented without a full explanation of the
facts upon which the expert's opinion is based. The trial judge can require
more complete disclosure, but the judge is unlikely to do so unless the adverse
party comes forward with some good reason to require such prior disclosure.
87
Under the North Carolina statute, the adverse party has an absolute right to
require that the expert disclose the "underlying facts or data on direct exami-
nation or voir dire before stating the opinion."88 This change is not very im-
portant unless it means that the adverse party now has the discretion vested in
the trial judge under the federal rule to decide whether the party offering the
expert's opinion must make the full proof of the basis that was required at
common law. Should the North Carolina statute be interpreted to give that
power to the adverse party, the statute will have a much smaller impact than
federal rule 705. A party offering expert opinion testimony would usually be
required by the adverse party to do everything necessary to lay a foundation
for a hypothetical question at common law, even though the examining party
need not ask a hypothetical question. It appears more likely, however, that the
statute will be interpreted as giving the adverse party only a right to some
prior disclosure from the expert himself. In that event it appears that the trial
judge would have discretion to decide if full proof should be required. Of
84. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice (Formerly Designated as Special Sub-
comm on Refrm of Federal Criminal Laws) of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on Proposed
Rules of Evidence, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 353, 355-56 (Supp. 1973) (correspondence of William B.
Miller, executive director, Colorado Bar Association).
85. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5, 1 705[01], at 705-1 to -2. Louisell and Muel-
ler comment on this same illustration: "It is precisely this Idnd of testimony which Rule 705
envisions, and modem decisions recognize as much." 3 D. LoUIsELL & C. MUELLER, supra note
38, § 400, at 707 (footnote omitted). McElhaney suggests that the illustrated testimony may be
longer than the Federal Rules of Evidence require and offers a shorter version:
Q. Doctor, would you tell us about the plaintiffs condition, please?
A. Yes. She is totally permanently disabled.
Q. Thank you, doctor, that is all.
McElhaney, supra note 25, at 480.
86. McElhaney, supra note 25, at 488.
87. Seesupra authorities cited at notes 38 & 42.
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-58.14 (1981).
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course, if it did begin to appear that there were no adequate basis for an opin-
ion, the party offering the opinion would be required to show that a basis did
exist.89 Adverse parties will not always exercise their right to require disclo-
sure, perhaps because they do not think such disclosure will help their case, or
perhaps to avoid similar demands that they prove the basis for their experts'
opinions. Nevertheless, it seems likely that there will be more unnecessary
proof of facts that the jury cannot understand under the North Carolina stat-
ute than there would be under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
B. The Form of Disclosure of Underlying Facts or Data
Under the procedure adopted by the North Carolina statute, an expert
witness must be able to explain the basis for his opinion by stating the facts
upon which he relies even though some or all of those facts are not within his
personal knowledge. This form of testimony will seem perfectly natural to the
expert and to many attorneys, but under prior law it would have been a viola-
tion of the rule that even an expert witness could not describe things known to
him only through hearsay.90 The statute must be read as creating a new, small
hearsay exception to circumvent this prior law. This procedure is not, how-
ever, a hearsay exception that can be used to introduce the facts relied upon as
substantive evidence. The expert's description of facts outside his personal
knowledge is not admissible as substantive evidence that those facts are true.
If it is necessary to prove those facts, other evidence must be introduced.
This requirement is an important, and potentially confusing, difference
between this small hearsay exception and the broader, more important excep-
tion for opinions based upon "inherently reliable" hearsay recognized under
Wade, Booker, and Franks. Under the rule enunciated in Wade the expert's
description of "inherently reliable" hearsay also is not admitted as substantive
evidence, 91 but the opinion based upon "inherently reliable" hearsay is admis-
sible as substantive evidence,92 and no additional evidence is necessary to sup-
port it. Under the minor exception, however, the expert may refer to facts that
do not qualify as "inherently reliable" hearsay, but evidence must be intro-
duced to prove that those facts are true.
C Disclosure of the Basis of Expert Opinions in Depositions
It has been suggested that the words "upon trial," with which G.S. 8-58.14
begins, restrict the manner in which a deposition of an expert witness must be
taken to be admissible at trial, requiring that during the taking of the deposi-
tion the basis for the opinion must be brought out before the opinion itself.9
3
Osborne Ayscue states, "Failure of counsel to do this may result in exclusion
89. See 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 38, § 400 at 708-09; Ayscue, supra note 67,
at 9.
90. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 4, §§ 14-15.
91. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 462-64, 251 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1979).
92. Id
93. Ayscue, supra note 67, at 9.
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of the deposition testimony with the witness unavailable to testify live.' '94 It is
clear that an opinion given in a deposition in which the expert's basis is not
explained is not admissible over objection. If a basis were given somewhere in
the deposition, however, the trial court should be able to admit the explana-
tion first and then the opinion, regardless of the order in which they were
given at the deposition. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that a rigid
rule has been created concerning the order of deposition testimony.
V. NORTH CAROLINA PERMITS EXPERT OPINIONS TO BE BASED UPON
"INHERENTLY RELIABLE" HEARSAY EVEN IF THAT HEARSAY IS
NOT INDEPENDENTLY ADMISSIBLE INTO EVIDENCE
A. Introduction
There is no provision in the new North Carolina statute that corresponds
to Federal Rule of Evidence 703. All questions concerning what facts may be
used as the basis for expert opinions and how those facts are to be proved are
controlled by the common law of North Carolina. The common-law rules that
have been recognized in recent decisions by the Supreme Court of North Car-
olina are, however, surprisingly similar to the new rules contained in federal
rule 703.
It is frequently convenient to draw a sharp distinction between the usual
common-law rules regarding expert witnesses and the new federal rules, but
many common-law courts recognized that expert witnesses could be more use-
ful in the courtroom if they were permitted to bring with them the approaches
to evidence they used in making decisions outside the courtroom. 95 North
Carolina courts frequently had allowed two kinds of experts-appraisers96
and physicians-to make sensible use of out-of-court information, but a series
of inconsistent decisions on the use of out-of-court information by physicians
had created such confusion that no one could say when North Carolina would
permit use of out-of-court information by experts.
In 1979, in State v. Wade,97 the Supreme Court of North Carolina began
to clarify the North Carolina rules. In that case the court announced two im-
portant principles. First, the court ruled that "[a] physician, as an expert wit-
ness, may give his opinion, including a diagnosis," which may be based upon
"information supplied him by others, including the patient, if such informa-
tion is inherently reliable even though it is not independently admissible into
evidence."98 Second, the court held that "[i]f his opinion is admissible the
expert may testify to the information he relied on in forming it for the purpose
94. Id
95. See note 32 supra.
96. See State Highway Comm'n v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d 553 (1965); Board of
Transp. v. Lyckan Dev. Co., 53 N.C. App. 511,281 S.E.2d 84 (1981). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d
1064 (1967).
97. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
98. Id. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
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of showing the basis of the opinion."99
Under Wade the expert's testimony concerning inadmissible information
is not admitted as substantive evidence, 1°° but the opinion based upon that
evidence clearly is admitted as substantive evidence, and the "inadmissible"
information can be used to show that the opinion is correct. 10 1 That is all a
party offering such expert testimony needs in order to make his case. The
North Carolina rules announced in Wade are actually clearer on these points
than federal rule 703, which merely provides that an expert may use inadmis-
sible facts "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field,"
leaving all questions about the extent to which the expert may explain his use
of such facts to be worked out at a later time by the courts.'
02
Although Wade was the first step in clarifying the confused North Caro-
lina law, a great deal of uncertainty remained. Part of this uncertainty was
caused by the facts in Wade, which made an extremely strong case for permit-
ting the expert to explain the basis of his opinion. The expert in Wade was a
psychiatrist who had treated defendant 0 3 and who had been prevented from
describing the conversations with defendant' °4 upon which he based his opin-
ion that defendant was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong on the
night he killed his wife and two children and stabbed himself'105 Although it
was clear that the conversation involved in that case satisfied the "inherent
reliability" standard adopted in Wade, it was not clear whether there would be
many other cases in which the out-of-court information relied upon by expert
witnesses would satisfy that standard.'
06
Another major cause of uncertainty about the effect of Wade was the
background of prior decisions against which it was decided. Wade did not
state that it was overruling any prior cases. 10 7 Instead, it purported to recon-
cile the prior decisions. 0
8
B. The Confusion Prior to Wade
The law of North Carolina prior to Wade 109 was extremely confused on
99. Id.
100. Id. at 464, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
101. Id. at 463-64, 251 S.E.2d at 412. Furthermore, this procedure will overcome not only
hearsay objections to "inherently reliable" evidence but also objections based upon requirements
for authentication or the best evidence rule. This has not been directly decided in the North
Carolina cases, but the "inherently reliable" test would not be very useful in cases such as State v.
Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 666 (1981) (test by assistant), and State v. Jones, 54 N.C. App.
482, 283 S.E.2d 546 (1982) (tests, charts, and records produced by other persons), unless it could
be used to solve the authentication problems involved in the use of records prepared by others.
102. See McElhaney, supra note 25, at 482-83.
103. 296 N.C. at 456, 251 S.E.2d at 408.
104. Id. at 457-58, 251 S.E.2d at 408-09.
105. Id at 458, 251 S.E.2d at 409.
106. See Note, Evidence-State v. Wade--Expert Testimony and the Dual Reliability Test, 58
N.C.L. Rev. 1161 (1980).
107. See 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412. But see 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 136 n.27.
108. 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
109. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
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the question whether an expert witness could base an opinion on facts that
were neither in evidence nor within the expert's personal knowledge. The de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on this question were in hope-
less conflict." 0 These decisions not only took apparently irreconcilable
positions; they failed to discuss the question whether any of the apparently
inconsistent prior decisons were being overruled."I
All of the leading North Carolina cases on this issue deal with testimony
by doctors or psychiatrists. 1' 2 In many jurisdictions, the statements involved
in some of these cases would have been admissible in evidence through a hear-
say exception for statements made to a doctor for the purpose of obtaining
treatment.113 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, this exception has been
expanded to include statements made either for the purpose of medical treat-
ment or solely for the purpose of medical diagnosis. 1
4
In 1957, in Penland v. Bird Coal Co.,' Is the Supreme Court of North Car-
olina held that the opinion testimony of a physician was admissible despite the
physician's reliance in whole or in part "on statements made to him by the
patient, if those statements [were] made . . . in the course of professional
treatment and with a view of effecting a cure, or during an examination made
for the purpose of treatment and cure."' 16 The court also held that the physi-
cian might testify to such statements for the limited purpose of showing the
basis of his opinion." 7 Apparently this was the first time the North Carolina
Supreme Court had been called upon to decide either question, 81 and the
110. See Note, Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina: In Search ofa Controlling
Precedent, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J 267 (1977); Note, Evidence-StAte v. Wade-Expert Testimony and
the Dual Reliability Test, 58 N.C.L. REv. 1161 (1980).
111. 1 H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 136 n.25.
112. See infra cases cited at notes 115, 122, 126, 135 & 146 and accompanying text.
113. See C. McCoRMICK, supra note 4, § 292.
114. FED. R. Evw. 803(4).
115. 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
116. Id at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.
117. Id
118. The current edition of STANSBuRY at the time Penland was decided was the 1946 first
edition. It contained this statement with respect to opinion testimony by expert witnesses: "The
witness may not base his opinion on facts related to him by the subject whose condition he is
testifying about, or by any other person, even though such person be another expert," D. SAmNs-
BURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136, at 269 (1st ed. 1946) (footnotes omitted). There were
numerous broad statements in the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court that were in
general accord with that statement by Stansbury, but none of those cases dealt with a doctor's use
of his patient's statements as a basis for his diagnosis. See, e.g., Spivey v. Newman, 232 N.C. 281,
59 S.E.2d 844 (1950). In the one case in which it may have been presented, State v. Alexander, 179
N.C. 759, 103 S.E. 383 (1920), the court did not reach a decision on that issue. In that case an
expert witness testifying that in his opinion defendant was insane at the time he committed the
crime was forbidden to repeat statements defendant had made to the expert concerning his "past
life". The court upheld the exclusion of such statements on the doubtful scientific theory that they
would be of no help in determining whether the defendant was insane. Id at 765, 103 S.E. at 386.
See also State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 459, 251 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1979).
In Moore v. Summers Drug Co., 206 N.C. 711, 175 S.E. 96 (1934), the court had permitted a
doctor to repeat his deceased patient's statements about when he had first felt pain around his
heart. That result could be described as an enormous stretching of the existing North Carolina
hearsay exception for statements of an existing physical condition. See Tucker v. Blackburn, 28
N.C. App. 455, 457, 221 S.E.2d 755, 756-57 (1976). It also could be described, however, as a
possible basis for a hearsay exception for all statements of a past mental or physical condition "by
Vol. 61
EXPERT WITNESSES
court cited no North Carolina authority on those questions.' 19 The rules
adopted by the court were, however, already in force in a substantial minority
of other American jurisdictions,120 and the court supported its decision with
citations to national authorities.
1 21
Nevertheless, in two similar cases decided in 1963 and 1967 the court an-
nounced decisions that appeared to be in conflict with its holdings in Penland.
It was impossible to determine whether the court intended to overrule Penland
or to distinguish it, because the court did not cite or discuss Penland in either
decision. Seawell v. Brame122 might easily have been distinguished from Pen-
land. In that case the court ordered a new trial because the physician who had
treated plaintiff had been permitted to give an opinion on the cause of plain-
tiff's illnesses based in part upon information received from plaintif's wife,
plaintiff's former employee, and other members of plaintiffs family.
123
Clearly, nothing in Penland required that an expert must be permitted to base
an opinion on out-of-court statements by third persons. The opinion in
Seawell declared, 124 however, that an expert's opinion must either be based
entirely upon personal knowledge or "upon an assumed state of facts sup-
ported by evidence and recited in a hypothetical question."'
1 5
It would have been much more difficult to distinguish Todd v. Watts
126
from Penland. In Todd a new trial was ordered because the doctor who had
treated plaintiff had been permitted to testify that in his opinion plaintiff had
sustained certain injuries as a result of an automobile accident.127 The doctor
had no personal knowledge that the accident had occurred 128 but had been
told about it by plaintiff when he took her medical history.129 Todd could
have been distinguished from Penland on the basis of a distinction between the
a patient to a physician made for the purpose of diagnosis and treatment," and the first edition of
STANSBURY pointed out that possibility. D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EvIDENCE § 161, at
338 (Ist ed. 1946). See also I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 161 nn.11-14. In State v. David, 222
N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942), the supreme court had decided that an expert witness could not
use information from another expert as the basis of opinion testimony when that information had
not been incorporated in a hypothetical question in which he was asked to assume that the jury
found that information to be true. Id at 253-57, 22 S.E.2d at 639-42.
119. The court did cite two cases that recognized the existence of ibe.North Carolina hearsay
exception for statements of present physical condition, Bryant v. Burns-Hammond Constr. Co.,
197 N.C. 639, 150 S.E. 122 (1929), and Martin v. P.H. Hanes Knitting Co., 189 N.C. 644, 127 S.E.
688 (1925).
120. C. McCoRMicK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 266 nn.4-5 (1st ed. 1954); An-
not., 51 A.L.R.2d 1051, 1057 (1957); 130 A.L.R. 977 (1941); Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1217, 1222 (1930).
121. 246 N.C. at 31, 97 S.E.2d at 436.
122. 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1963).
123. Id. at 669-71, 129 S.E.2d at 286-88.
124. Id at 671, 129 S.E.2d at 287-88.
125. The court in Seawell quoted the language from the first edition of STANSBURY, quoted at
the beginning of note 118 supra, but there was no issue in the case involving the use of statements
by the patient himself. See I D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136 n.71 (H.
Brandis rev. 1973).
126. 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967).
127. Id at 419-21, 152 S.E.2d at 450-51.
128. Id at 420, 152 S.E.2d at 451.
129. Id at 419-20, 152 S.E.2d at 450.
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kinds of information the two doctors had been given by their patients.130
Some courts have drawn a distinction between permitting doctors to rely upon
patients' statements about past symptoms and allowing doctors to rely upon
patients' statements concerning the external causes of their injuries.131 Pen-
land involved past symptoms, 132 while the reference to the accident in Todd
was a reference to an external cause. In neither Penland nor Todd, however,
did the court draw any such distinction, and Chief Justice Parker, dissenting in
Todd, argued that Penland was inconsistent with the result in Todd.133 Thus,
the decision in Todd created great uncertainty about whether Pen/and had
been overruled.'
34
In 1974 and 1975 the court decided two cases that further increased the
confusion in North Carolina case law. In State v. DeGregory'35 the court con-
fronted a situation in which an expert witness, who had testified on behalf of
the State that defendant was not insane, 136 had been invited to base his opin-
ion upon both his examination of defendant "and any other information con-
tained in [defendant's] official record of which [he was] the custodian and had
available to [him]."' 137 The court upheld the conviction based upon this expert
testimony on two grounds. One ground was that defendant had not been
prejudiced even if the expert should not have been permitted to base his opin-
ion on out-of-court information.' 38 The second ground, however, was that it
was in fact proper for the expert to base his opinion upon information con-
tained in the patient's official hospital record.' 39 This was a broader view of
the function of expert opinion testimony than the North Carolina Supreme
Court had ever before taken. The opinion quoted with approval from an
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:
[A]n expert witness who is available for cross-examination at the trial
may use such records as the basis of an opinion without the propo-
130. Brandis, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, Evidence, 45 N.C.L. REv. 934, 950-51
(1967); Note, Evidence-Expert Testimony-Physician'r Opinion Based on Patient's Statements, 46
N.C.L. REV. 960, 965-66 (1968).
131. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 292, at 691-92.
132. 246 N.C. at 29-30, 97 S.E.2d at 434-35.
133. 269 N.C. at 421-23, 152 S.E.2d at 451-52 (Parker, C.J., dissenting).
134. Brandis, supra note 130, at 951; Note, supra note 130 at 966-76; D. STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136, at 105 (2d ed. Supp. 1970).
135. 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
136. Id. at 128, 203 S.E.2d at 799.
137. Id. at 128-29, 203 S.E.2d at 799. The question and the opinion of the court both seem to
refer to some sort of file of written records prepared by hospital staff persons, but it is not clear
that the expert restricted himself to such written information. The expert referred to "information
furnished me by members of my staff," id. at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 800-01, and also testified, "I have
some general knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the crime with which Karl DeGregory
is charged." Id
138. Id at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802-03. The court argued that some of the expert's statements
indicated that his opinion was "based strictly on his own personal observation of defendant." Id
at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802. This argument is unpersuasive. Not only does it appear unwise to
attempt to read into the transcript of the expert's testimony a standard that was not applied at
trial, but the defendant had no opportunity to make use of that standard either on cross-examina-




nent having to call every person who made a recorded observation.
[Citations omitted.] With the increased division of labor in modern
medicine, the physician making a diagnosis must necessarily rely on
many observations and tests performed by others and recorded by
them; records sufficient for diagnosis in the hospital ought to be
enough for opinion testimony in the courtroom.
140
In DeGregory the court appeared to adopt a view of expert opinion testimony
potentially as broad as Federal Rule of Evidence 703:141 "[A]n expert witness
has wide latitude in gathering information and may base his opinion on evi-
dence not otherwise admissible." 142 The opinion suggested that "information
within the personal knowledge of an expert" should not be considered to be
limited to "knowledge derived solely from matters personally observed."' 143
The supreme court cited three North Carolina cases in support of this argu-
ment. 44 One of these was Penland, which was discussed as if there had never
been any question of its being overruled by Todd.145 Todd was neither cited
nor discussed.
In 1975 the court considered a fact situation very similar to DeGregory in
State v. Bock.' 46 In this case, however, the testimony of defendant's expert
had been excluded.' 47 One of the reasons for its exclusion was that it was
based upon information not in evidence that the psychiatrist expert witness
had obtained from defendant, his family, and his friends. 148 It might have
been possible to distinguish this out-of-court information from the out-of-
court records upon which the State's psychiatrist was permitted to rely in De-
Gregory, but the court made no effort to distinguish the two cases. DeGregory
was not cited. Instead, Todd and Penland were both cited, 149 but Penland was
construed to permit the use of statements made to a "physician" as a basis for
expert opinion only if the statement had been made during an examination for
the purpose of treatment.' 50 Thus, relying on Penland the court held that
testimony by the psychiatrist based upon information given to him during an
examination conducted for the purpose of testifying as a witness was
inadmissible.'
5 '
In 1976 Dean Brandis looked at this group of cases and wrote, "Since no
case has been overruled and no thorough judicial attempt to reconcile these
various decisions has been made, this writer can only conclude that there is at
140. 285 N.C. at 134, 203 S.E.2d at 802 (brackets in original) (quoting Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775, 779-80 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965)).
141. See Note, Expert Medical Opinion Evidence in North Carolina: In Search of a Controlling
Precedent, 8 N.C. CENT. L.J. 267, 285 (1977).
142. 285 N.C. at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 801.
143. Id (emphasis in original).
144. Id at 132-33, 203 S.E.2d at 801-02.
145. Id at 132, 203 S.E.2d at 801.
146. 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975).
147. Id at 154, 217 S.E.2d at 519.
148. Id at 162, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
149. Id at 162-63, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
150. Id
151. Id at 163, 217 S.E.2d at 524.
1982]
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
hand a convenient precedent for the next decision, whatever its tenor may
be."'152 Three years later, however, when the Supreme Court of North
Carolina finally undertook in State v. Wade153 the task of reconciling the prior
cases and creating a sensible rule for North Carolina, Dean Brandis qualified
his earlier conclusion with a statement that Wade "has now, to a considerable
extent, clarified the rule."'
54
C. Application of the "Inherently Reliable" Test
Wade adopted an excellent system to permit the use of expert opinions
based upon "inherently reliable" information even if that information was not
independently admissible evidence. The opinion in Wade apparently was in-
tended to provide the "universally applicable rule"' 55 that had been absent
from prior North Carolina cases. But several features of that opinion left
room for doubt about whether the "inherently reliable" test of Wade would
apply to all cases in which an expert witness might reasonably wish to base an
opinion on reliable information not in evidence. Wade did not expressly over-
rule any prior cases156 or state a general rule to determine when evidence was
inherently reliable. Indeed, Wade did not state that the "inherently reliable"
test would apply to testimony by experts other than physicians. Furthermore,
the great strength of the facts'5 7 supporting the result in Wade created uncer-
tainty' 58 about what other kinds of evidence might satisfy the Wade test.
It would have been possible to argue that the "inherently reliable" test
was a more demanding standard than the corresponding test under Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, which permits experts to base opinions upon inadmissi-
ble evidence if the evidence is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field." A close reading of three cases in which the Supreme
Court of North Carolina applied the test in 1979, 1980 and 1981, however,
reveals that the court has been using the "inherently reliable" test as if it were
exactly the same as the federal "reasonably relied upon" test. In these cases,
"inherently reliable" means "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particu-
lar field."
This article proposes that these cases have correctly interpreted the "in-
herently reliable" test and that any other interpretation would bring back the
inconsistency and confusion of the decisions prior to Wade. Indeed, it is possi-
ble to argue that a "reasonably relied upon" test is exactly the interpretation
the Supreme Court of North Carolina intended when it adopted the "inher-
152. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136 (H. Brandis rev. Supp. 1976).
153. 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
154. 1 D. STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 136 (H. Brandis rev. Supp. 1979).
155. 296 N.C. at 460, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
156. Dean Brandis points out that Wade and State v. Franks, 301 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177
(1980), do appear to overrule Todd v. Watts, 269 N.C. 417, 152 S.E.2d 448 (1967), although
neither case cites Todd. I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12, § 136 n.27.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
158. See Note, Evidence-State v. Wade--Expert Testimony and the Dual Reliability Test, 58
N.C.L. REV. 1161, 1172-74 (1980).
[Vol. 61
EXPERT WITNESSES
ently reliable" test in Wade. The adoption of the test clearly was intended to
be a response not only to the facts of Wade but also to the confusion of prior
case law. That confusion clearly demanded a consistent rule. Once some ex-
perts are permitted to base their opinions on reliable inadmissible evidence,
logic and fairness require that all experts be permitted to base their opinions
on similarly reliable inadmissible evidence. The confusion of the pre-Wade
North Carolina cases was largely a product of attempts to avoid that truth.
In three post-Wade cases, Booker v. Duke Medical Center,159 State v.
Franks,'60 and State v. Jackson,16 1 the court upheld the use of hearsay as the
basis of a physician's opinion, but in none of these cases did the court attempt
to state a general theory for determining when evidence is "inherently relia-
ble." In Jackson the court did not even use that term. Nevertheless, the three
cases strongly support a broad interpretation of the "inherently reliable" test
as generally equivalent to the "reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field" test of Federal Rule of Evidence 703.
In Booker the court held that both medical information given by one doc-
tor to another about a common patient and statements made by that patient
were "inherently reliable." Chief Justice Sharp wrote:
Finally, we do not think the hearing commissioner erred in al-
lowing Dr. Currin to base his opinion in part on a medical history he
obtained from the other treating physician and from Booker
himself....
Statements made by a patient to his physician for the purposes
of treatment and medical information obtained from a fellow-physi-
cian who has treated the same patient are "inherently reliable"
within the meaning of these rules. State v. Wade, 296 N.C. at 462-63,
251 S.E.2d at 412; State v. DeGregory, 285 N.C. 122, 134, 203 S.E.2d
794, 802 (1974).
162
The strong facts 163 supporting the result in Wade had created uncer-
tainty' 64 concerning the kinds of evidence that would qualify as "inherently
reliable." The decision in Booker expanded the known scope of the "inher-
ently reliable" test in three ways. First, it rejected the possibility 165 that only
evidence which combined several different assurances of reliability could
qualify as "inherently reliable." Second, it demonstrated that a statement
made by an ordinary patient for the purpose of treatment would qualify.
159. 297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979).
160. 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980).
161. 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 666 (1981).
162. 297 N.C. at 479, 256 S.E.2d at 202.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05.
164. See Note, supra note 158, at 1172-74.
165. Wade left open this possibility. Id The court in Booker concluded that statements made
by a patient to his physician for purposes of treatment, and medical information obtained from
fellow physicians who had treated the patient were "inherenty reliable" without further investiga-
tion. 297 N.C. at 479, 256 S.E.2d at 202.
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Third, it demonstrated that information given by one physician to another
would qualify.
The physician who supplied information to the testifying physician in
Booker had, of course, no desire to promote his own health as a motive that
would support his reliability. The court clearly was assuming that the very
process of fact gathering carried out by experts such as physicians was a suffi-
cient basis for a finding of "inherent reliability." It was undoubtedly in sup-
port of this point that the court cited State v. DeGregory'66 as well as Wade.
The inherent reliability of records used by physicians in making a diagnosis
does not depend upon whether the patient was receiving treatment or merely
being diagnosed. DeGregory itself was a case in which a nontreating psychia-
trist testified on the basis of his own interviews and records made by others
during a diagnostic commitment of the defendant.
167
In State v. Franks168 the court took a major step forward. It held that the
"inherently reliable" standard could be satisfied by statements made to a psy-
chiatrist who was not treating the person who made the statements. 169 In
Wade the court had found two grounds for holding that defendant's state-
ments to his psychiatrist were "inherently reliable."' 170 First, they were state-
ments made by a patient to a treating doctor for the purpose of treatment.171
That alone would be enough to qualify the statements for admission as sub-
stantive evidence in many jurisdictions172 and under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(4).173 Second, the Wade court found
a sufficient indication of the reliability of these statements in the na-
ture of Dr. Maloney's entire examination. This examination ...
was a thorough, carefully designed attempt to gain an understanding
of defendant's state of mind. Dr. Maloney did not rely for his con-
clusions on any one statement by defendant or on any particular fact
he disclosed. Instead he took into account the entirety of what de-
fendant said together with his own interpretation and analysis of it
and the objective manifestations that accompanied it. The assertion
of State v. Alexander. . .that "[c]onversation with one alleged to be
insane is, of course, one of the best evidences of his present state of
mind" is still true. Conversation, and its interpretation and analysis
by a trained professional, is undoubtedly superior to any other
method the courts have for gaining access to an allegedly insane de-
fendant's mind. When it is conducted with the professional safe-
guards present here, it provides a sufficient basis for the introduction
of an expert diagnosis into evidence.
174
166. 285 N.C. 122, 203 S.E.2d 794 (1974).
167. Id at 131, 203 S.E.2d at 801.
168. 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980).
169. Id at 9, 265 S.E.2d at 182.
170. 296 N.C. at 462, 251 S.E.2d at 412.
171. Id
172. See C. McCotmicx,, supra note 4, § 292.
173. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5, 803(4)[01].
174. 296 N.C. at 463, 251 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting State v. Alexander, 179 N.C. 759, 765, 103
S.E. 383, 386 (1920)) (citation omitted).
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In Franks, a psychiatrist who had examined defendant after the trial
judge referred defendant to Dorothea Dix Hospital testified for the State.' 7 5
The court held that the psychiatrist's opinion, which was based upon his con-
versations with Franks, satisfied the test of Wade because he had obtained his
information in a "thorough and professional" diagnostic examination.1
76
In 1981 the court reaffirmed in State v. Jackson 177 its commitment to De-
Gregory by upholding the use by a nontreating 178 psychiatrist of the results of
a test that may have been conducted by an assistant. The court stated that "a
diagnostic opinion is not incompetent even if based on information obtained
from others."' 17 9 The effect of this decision was to reaffirm that the kinds of
professional information normally used by such experts qualify as "inherently
reliable," although the court did not use the term "inherently reliable" and
cited only DeGregory.
D. Three Questions About the "Inherently Reliable" Test
The present state of the North Carolina case law leaves unanswered a
great many questions about the scope of the "inherently reliable" test. Three
issues that may need to be resolved are: (1) whether the test applies to opin-
ions of experts other than physicians; (2) whether the test applies to informa-
tion from persons who are not patients; and (3) whether the test applies to
opinions based upon statements by a patient to a nontreating physician when
that patient offers the physician's opinion. The remainder of this article will
attempt to demonstrate that the Supreme Court of North Carolina has already
answered the first two questions affirmatively and that those two answers sup-
port an affirmative answer to the third question.
1. Does the "Inherently Reliable" Test Apply to Opinions of Experts
Other than Physicians?
Although the cases in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina has
discussed the "inherently reliable" test all involved testimony by physicians,180
the court has established in two different ways that the test can be applied to
testimony by experts who are not physicians. First, the court has already per-
mitted a real estate appraiser 81 and an auditor to give opinions based upon
175. 300 N.C. at 12-13, 265 S.E.2d at 184.
176. Id at 13, 265 S.E.2d at 184.
177. 302 N.C. 101, 273 S.E.2d 666 (1981).
178. The facts of Jackson were nearly identical to DeGregory. Defendant had been committed
to Dorothea Dix Hospital for a competency evaluation. Id at 103, 273 S.E.2d at 669. At trial the
prosecution tried to suggest that its psychiatrist, who had interviewed defendant during that com-
mitment, was a treating physician, Record at 212-13, Jackson, but the facts introduced did not
support such a characterization of the relationship between the psychiatrist and the defendant,
Record at 210-17, and the court properly decided the case without referring to this evidence.
179. 302 N.C. at 110, 273 S.E.2d at 673.
180. See State v. Franks, 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980); Booker v. Duke Medical Center,
297 N.C. 458, 256 S.E.2d 189 (1979); State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 251 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
181. State Highway Comm'n v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d 553 (1965). See also Board
of Transp. v. Lyckan Dev. Corp., 53 N.C. App. 511, 281 S.E.2d 84 (1981).
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inadmissible hearsay of a kind that such experts normally use. The case in-
volving opinions of an auditor, State v. Louchheim,18 2 was decided one month
before Wade.
Second, the "inherently reliable" test has been applied by the court, ex-
pressly in Booker and impliedly in DeGregory and Jackson, to data used by
physicians that was furnished to them by persons who were not their patients.
The justification for treating as "inherently reliable" the medical history re-
peated by a fellow physician in Booker,183 entries in the patient's record made
by others in DeGregory, '8 4 and a test that may have been conducted by an
assistant in Jackson '8 5 is that each was a part of the expert's normal and rela-
tively reliable process. Much of the information used by auditors, appraisers,
and other experts is equally reliable for use as a part of the basis for their
opinions.
2. Does the "Inherently Reliable" Test Apply to Information from Persons
Who Are Not Patients?
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that the court has fre-
quently held that statements by persons who were not patients could be used if
they satisfied the "inherently reliable" test. In the cases involving the ap-
praiser' 86 and the auditor 8 7 there was, of course, no patient; but even in cases
involving patients and physicians, such as Booker, DeGregory, and Jackson,
some or all of the inherently reliable information did not come from the pa-
tient.' 88 All of these cases strongly support the conclusion reached by the
court in State v. Franks8 9 that a statement made by a patient need not be
made for the purpose of treatment in order to be "inherently reliable." These
cases call for a reconsideration of the portions of Seawell v. Beame' 90 and
State v. Bock' 9' which hold that it is improper for a physician to base an
opinion upon information received outside the courtroom from a patient's
family or friends. If treatment is involved, family and friends would seem to
have nearly as strong a motiveto tell the truth as the patient himself.192 Even
182. 296 N.C. 314, 250 S.E.2d 630 (1979).
183. 297 N.C. at 478-79, 256 S.E.2d at 202.
184. 285 N.C. at 130-31, 203 S.E.2d at 800-01.
185. 302 N.C. at 110, 273 S.E.2d at 672-73. See also State v. Jones, 54 N.C. App. 482, 283
S.E.2d 546 (1981).
186. State Highway Comm'n v. Conrad, 263 N.C. 394, 139 S.E.2d 553 (1965).
187. State v. Louchheim, 296 N.C. 314, 250 S.E.2d 630 (1979).
188. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
189. 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980).
190. 258 N.C. 666, 129 S.E.2d 283 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
191. 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
192. The court recognized this fact in Wade with respect to the limited situation of "one un-
able to speak for himself as, for example, when a parent communicates a small child's condition to
a physician." 296 N.C. at 461 n.5, 251 S.E.2d at 411 n.5. See also I H. BRANDIS, supra note 12,
§ 136 n.26. The situation described cries out for the application of the "inherently reliable" test to
the parent's statements, but it is highly unlikely that a parent would feel any weaker compulsion to
tell the truth in order to assist the treatment of a child or spouse who could speak for himself.
[Vol. 61
EXPERT WITNESSES
if treatment is not involved, the proper question is whether the physician col-
lects and uses such statements as a part of a reasonable and reliable procedure.
3. Does the "Inherently Reliable" Test Apply to Opinions Based upon
Statements to a Nontreating Physician When that Patient Offers
the Physician's Opinion?
It might appear surprising that there should be a question about the appli-
cability of the "inherently reliable" test to testimony by a nontreating physi-
cian offered by the patient himself. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
held in State v. Franks193 that a nontreating physician could testify on the
basis of such statements if they were made in the course of a "thorough and
professional" diagnostic examination.1 94 The court also has upheld similar
testimony by a nontreating195 psychiatrist based in part upon statements by
the patient-defendant in State v. DeGregory9 6 and State v. Jackson 
197 without
discussing the point.
Nevertheless, in 1981 in State v. Duvall,198 the court of appeals upheld the
exclusion of testimony by a psychiatrist offered by defendant because the rec-
ord did not indicate that the psychiarist "was treating defendant as a regular
patient with a view towards treatment or cure." 199 The court went on to say,
"If medical advice is sought merely for the purpose of defense at trial, the
assumption of inherent truthfulness of the information given to the doctor is
absent."2°° Franks, Booker, and DeGregory were not cited or discussed. In-
stead, the court of appeals relied upon Wade and two pre- Wade cases, State v.
Bock 20 and Ward v. Wertz. 20 2 Franks, Booker, and DeGregory were not
cited by defendant,203 but if they had been cited the court of appeals would
have had to decide whether they overruled the portion of Bock which held
that statements made to a physician could not be used as a basis for expert
opinion unless they were made for the purpose of treatment.
The conflict between Bock and Franks, Booker, DeGregory, and Jackson
must be resolved. The proper resolution is to admit expert opinions based
upon diagnostic examinations on an even-handed basis. If opinions based
upon statements made during a diagnostic interview are admissible on behalf
of the state, they should also be admissible on behalf of the defendant.
. Expert opinions based upon diagnostic statements made as part of a
193. 300 N.C. 1, 265 S.E.2d 177 (1980).
194. Id at 9, 265 S.E.2d at 182.
195. See supra notes 167 & 178 and accompanying text.
196. 285 N.C. 122, 130-31, 203 S.E.2d 794, 800-01 (1974).
197. 302 N.C. 101, 109-10, 273 S.E.2d 666, 672-73 (1981).
198. 50 N.C. App. 684, 275 S.E.2d 842, rev'don other grounds, 304 N.C. 557, 284 S.E.2d 495
(1981).
199. Id at 698, 275 S.E.2d at 854.
200. Id
201. 288 N.C. 145, 217 S.E.2d 513 (1975); see supra text accompanying notes 146-51.
202. 20 N.C. App. 229, 201 S.E.2d 194 (1973).
203. See Defendant Appellant's Brief at 30-36, State v. Duvall.
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"thorough and professional" medical examination cannot be distinquished
from "inherently reliable" statements made to auditors and appraisers. The
purpose of admitting such opinions is to make the best use of expert witnesses
by permitting them to use the methods of collecting information that they
would normally use. General reliability is ensured by the professional meth-
ods used.
It should be kept in mind that in a majority of jurisdictions a description
of the medical history of a patient given to a physician for the purpose of
treatment is now admissible for substantive use under an independent hearsay
exception. 204 In those jurisdictions the only statements of medical history that
are admitted for the limited use permitted by Wade are statements not made
for the purpose of the treatment. 20 5 Furthermore, many jurisdictions are fol-
lowing the Federal Rules of Evidence2°6 and adopting a complete hearsay
exception for even those diagnostic statements.207 Dean Brandis argues per-
suasively that North Carolina ought to adopt a hearsay exception permitting
substantive use of statements made for the purpose of treatment.208 Similarly,
North Carolina ought to permit at least nonsubstantive use of diagnostic state-
ments as the basis of expert opinion.
North Carolina cannot follow both the rule in Bock and the rule in
Franks, Booker, DeGregory, and Jackson without returning to the confusion
that preceded Wade. Instead, we must recognize that the "inherently reliable"
test announced in Wade is essentially the same as the "reasonably relied
upon" test of Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Both Wade and the federal rule
rest upon the same insight into the greater usefulness that expert witnesses will
be able to offer if they are allowed to bring their normal professional methods
into the courtroom. Both tests should set the same standard and reach the
same result.
204. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5, 803(4)[02]; Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 778,
801-02 (1971).
205. C. McCoRMicK, supra note 4, § 293.
206. FED. R. EvID. 803(4); see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5, 803(4)[01].
207. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 5, 1 803(4)[02].
208. 1 H. BRANDis, supra note 12, § 161.
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